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STATUTORY PROVISION"

There are no controlling statutory provisions that afie,..

disposition of this case other than the Utah Rules of Evidence and
case law cited hereinafter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Son T. Nguyen, was charged with Receiving
Stolen Property, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated

76-6-408

(1953

as

Amended),

in

that

the

Defendant

allegedly, on or about October 27, 1992, in Utah County, Utah
received, retained or disposed of another's property knowing that
it had been stolen, or believing that it probably had been stolen,
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, said property having
a value in excess of $1,000.00.
The Defendant was convicted by the trial court, sitting
without a jury of the crime but the court found that the value of
the property attributed to the Defendant had a value in excess of
$250.00 but less than $1,000.00, a Third Degree Felony.
The Appellant appeals his conviction herein.
PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE
1.
1992

The Information was filed in this matter on November 18,

(R. 1 ) .
2.

A Preliminary hearing was held on November 17, 1992 and as

a result thereof, the Defendant was bound over to District Court
(R. 8-9).
3.

The Defendant entered a Not Guilty plea to the charge at

his Arraignment which took place on December 9, 1992 (R. 13).
4.
trial.

Counsel for the Defendant filed various motions before
Specifically, Defendant, through counsel, filed a Motion in
3
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by the trial court and Adult Probation and Parole (R. 124-25) .
10.

The Defendant, through counsel, served and filed a Notice

of Appeal on March 16, 1993 (R. 127) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Facts Relating to the Theft From 7-11 in Price
Utah on October 10 or 11, 1992,

1.

The prosecution's witness, Louise Roybal testified that

she was a clerk at a 7-11 Store located in Price, Utah (Tr. 7, L.
19 to 8, L. 7 ) . While working the graveyard shift on October 10,
1992, she observed seven Oriental individuals playing the four or
five video games located in the store (Tr. 8, L. 19 to 9, L. 13).
The individuals bought approximately $50.00 worth of merchandise.
The clerk testified that the Oriental individuals did not leave the
store together, but in pairs (Tr. 9, L. 23 to 10, L. 11). Louise,
while cleaning around the machines the next morning, noticed no
damage of any kind to the machines (Tr. 18, L. 10-19).
2.

Barbara Jean Robinette testified that she was the manager

of the 7-11 Store in Price as of October 10, 1992.

As the result

of a phone call from her assistant on the morning of October 11,
1992, she went to the store and discovered that one of the coin
operated video games was not working.

On October 12, 1992, one day

later, Ms. Robinette discovered that the lock had been cut, a
circuit board taken from the machine and the coin box emptied (Tr.
12, L.14 to 16, Line 18).
3.

Officer

Tracy

Lynn Allred

of

the

Price

City

Police

Department testified that he went to the 7-11 Store as a result of
5
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Calls

dispatchers

to

were

placed

businesses

in

by

other

Spanish

Utah
Fork

County
Canyon

Sheriff's

and

to

the

dispatcher in Price who indicated that thefts had occurred from
video machines in the area, which information was added to the ATL
(Attempt to Locate Card) (Tr. 32, L. 24 to 38, L. 10).
6.

Shannon Horn also checked the license plate number and

found that the car was registered to a Vietnamese person, whose
license was suspended (Tr. 38, Lines 11 to 20) . Ms. Horn testified
that the information was accumulated prior to the stop of the
vehicle Defendant was driving (Tr. 38, Line 17 to 39, L. 19).
7.

Penney Turner, a dispatcher for the Department of Public

Safety, State of Utah, which includes the Highway Patrol testified
that she was on the day shift on October 27, 1992.
testified

that

she

had

received

a ATL

from

the

Ms. Turner
Utah

County

Sheriff's office that morning and that at approximately 10:30 a.m.,
dispatched an ATL on four suspicious Oriental that had left the
Skyview Cafe trying to sell three to four hundred dollars worth of
quarters wrapped

in yellow paper.

Approximately

five minutes

later, Ms. Turner received additional information from the Utah
County Sheriff's Office that the individuals had just left the
Little Acorn cafe.

At the same time, Ms. Turner was advised that

the individuals were suspects in vending machine burglaries out of
Carbon and Emery County (Tr. 42, L. 4 to 49, L. 20). Ms. Turner
testified that she was in contact with the officer making the stop
and all of the information accumulated by her relating to the ATL
had been dispatched to the officer before 10:45 a.m., the time of
7

the traffic stop of the vehicle the Defendant was driving (Tr. 50,
L. 6 to L. 14) .
C.

Facts Relating to the Traffic Stop of the Vehicle
the Defendant was Driving,

8.

Mr. Dennis Shields testified that he was a trooper with

the Utah Highway Patrol and was on patrol during the morning of
October 27, 1992

(Tr. 55, L. 21 to 56, L. 9) . Officer Shields

testified that he received an ATL on a white Toyota with Utah
Plates containing four Oriental individuals that was heading from
the

Little

northbound.

Acorn

cafe

at

the

mouth

of

Spanish

Fork

Canyon

Further, he had been notified that the individuals had

gone to the Little Acorn to sell rolls of quarters that were
wrapped up in yellow paper to the owner of the Little Acorn (Tr.
57, L. 14 to 58, L. 6) .
9.

Officer Shields testified

Transportation unit spotted

that another Department

of

the car, a tan Toyota with the license

plate that was given, northbound in the American Fork area (Tr. 58,
L. 7 to L. 17) . Officer Shields overtook the car himself and as he
was making the traffic stop, he was informed that representatives
of Price City wanted to talk to the individuals in connection with
a burglary in the area (Tr. 58, L. 18 to L. 23) .
10.

Officer Shields identified the Defendant as the driver

and immediately obtained the keys from the ignition to the car (Tr.
64, L. 10 to L. 20). Officer Shields then asked the Defendant if
he had any large amount of quarters wrapped in yellow paper to
which the Defendant answered, "no" (Tr.59, L. 23 to 60, L. 10) .
8

The

officer,

after

obtaining

the

Defendant's

identification,

required the Defendant to exit the vehicle (Tr. 60, L. 11 to L.15) .
The officer asked the Defendant other questions relating to where
they had been and questions relating to the ownership of the car
(Tr. 60, L. 20 to 61, L. 25) . Minutes later, Deputy Hill, with the
Utah County Sheriff's Department took the Defendant back to his
vehicle (Tr. 62, L. 5 to L. 16; 65, L. 8 to L. 23).
11.

Mr. David Hill testified that he was a Deputy Utah County

Sheriff and was on duty on October 27, 1992.

Deputy Hill received

the ATL at 9:54 a.m. He testified that it is regular procedure to
stop a vehicle identified in the ATL and obtain information from
them, contact the agency the originated the ATL and obtain the
requested information (Tr.67, L. 7 to 68, L. 18).
12.
containing

Deputy Hill received information in the form of an ATL
similar

information

that was dispatched

to

Officer

Shields (Tr. 68, L. 23 to 72, L. 20). Deputy Hill was located at
Mountain Springs when he learned that the vehicle in question had
been stopped by the Utah Highway Patrol.

It then took Deputy Hill

fifteen minutes to arrive at the location in American Fork where
the Defendant's vehicle had beens stopped (Tr. 72. L. 16 to 73, L.
3) .
13.

Upon arriving at the scene, Deputy Hill identified the

Defendant, as the driver and took him back to his vehicle.

Deputy

Hill told the Defendant the circumstances that gave rise to the
stop

and

asked

the Defendant

basic

questions

relating

ownership of the car and the owner's phone number.
9

to

the

The Defendant

told Deputy Hill that he had no quarters in the car (Tr. 73, L. 22
to 75, L. 18) . Deputy Hill was unable to testify when the search of
the vehicle began in relation to the questioning of the Defendant
(Tr.78, L. 25 to 79, Line 7 ) . Later in his testimony Deputy Hill
stated that after he had gotten the Defendant in his vehicle and
explained the reason for the stop, he advised him of his Miranda
rights from memory (Tr. 104, L. 10 to L. 19).

The Defendant was

asked only if he understood his rights but was not asked if he
waived his rights (Tr. 104, L.21 to 105, L. 9 ) .
14.

Deputy Hill then interrogated the Defendant about the

quarters, where the Defendant and the other occupants of the car
had been and the identity of the owner of the car.

The Defendant

denied having any quarters, indicated that they had been visiting
a friend in Colorado Springs and that the car was owned by his
friend, "Bo", whose telephone number he did not know (Tr. 105, L.
10 to 106, L. 9 ) .
15.

As Deputy Hill was interrogating

the Defendant, the

search of the vehicle the Defendant was driving was conducted by
other officers, including Dennis Shields (Tr. 106, Lines 7 to 13;
112, L. 6 to 114, Line 11) . A duffel bag was retrieved from the car
containing both unrolled and rolled quarters (totaling $2,096.75)
and a pair of vice grips. A yellow legal pad of paper, bolt cutters
and screwdrivers were found in other locations in the car (Tr. 106,
L. 14 to 109, L. 4; 111, Lines 4 to 14).
D.
16.

Facts Relating to the Confession of the Defendant,
Mr. Scott Cater testified that he was a Deputy Utah
10

County Sheriff on October 27, 1992, and met with the Defendant

at

the American Fork police station (Tr. 122, L. 18 to 123, L. 5) .
Deputy Carter was told that another officer had mirandized the
Defendant and only gave the Defendant a brief reminder of his
rights.

Again, no one asked the Defendant if he waived his rights

(Tr. 123, Lines 6 to 25) .
17.

The Defendant indicated that he and his companions had

gone on a three day trip to Colorado, had been involved in four
burglaries, two in Colorado Springs and two in other unspecified
locations and that some of the quarters in his possession came from
those burglaries

(Tr. 125, Line 22 to 127, Line 21) .

Two days

later, on October 29, 1992, a written statement, Exhibit 11, was
taken from the Defendant

(Tr. 128, L. 18 to

13 0, L. 22) . The

Defendant detailed how money had been taken from the coin operated
machines in 7-11 Stores in Colorado (Tr. 131, L. 5 to 134, L. 16).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence of the burglary that occurred in Price, Utah
on October 10 or 11, 1992, because there is absolutely no evidence
that links that theft to the Defendant or the evidence in this
case.
Secondly, the trial court erred in ruling that the attempt by
persons in the Defendant's car to exchange quarters for currency,
without more, was sufficient for the officers involved to form a
"reasonable suspicion" justifying the stop of the Defendant's car
on the highway.
11

Third, the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion
to

Suppress

Defendant's

the

evidence

obtained

from

the

search

of

the

car on the grounds that the search was without a

warrant or the consent of the Defendant and the officers lacked the
requisite

factual

basis

to

form

the

necessary

suspicion

to

authorize the search. Additionally, the Defendant was unreasonably
detained on the roadway and based thereon, the evidence from the
search should have been suppressed.
Finally,

the

court

erred

in

admitting

evidence

of

the

defendant's statements without clear independent proof of a crime.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE
BURGLARY IN PRICE, UTAH.
In reviewing the transcript of the hearing in this matter, the
intent of the prosecution in introducing the evidence related to
the alleged theft from the 7-11 Store in Price is perplexing.
The alleged theft occurred on October 10 or 11, 1992 in Price.
The Defendant was stopped on October 27, 1992, sixteen days later.
The theft was not discovered by the 7-11 store manager in Price
until the morning of October 12, 1992.

There is no evidence that

the seven oriental individuals that wsre seen by the store clerk
had anything to do with the theft as opposed to other patrons or
employees of the store.

It is unbelievable that the trial court

would allow the introduction of the evidence based upon the fact
that seven Oriental individuals happened to visit the site of a
12

burglary within forty-eight hours of it's discovery.
There was no forensic evidence that the bolt cutters, vice
grips or other tools found in the vehicle driven by the Defendant
had

anything

Defendant

nor

to

do

the

with
three

the

burglary

people

identified by the store clerk.

in

traveling

Price.
with

Neither

him

could

the
be

In sum, there is not a scintilla of

evidence that the Defendant had anything to do with the Price
theft.

To allow evidence of other crimes without any foundation

that the charged Defendant was involved is violative of the Utah
Rules of Evidence and interpreting case law.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E.

Further, Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules

of Evidence provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
Admission of evidence under Rule 4 04(b) is a question of law
and is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness.

The trial

court's underlying factual determination should be given deference
by the appellate court and should only be overruled when they are
clearly erroneous. State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 848 P. 2d
694 (Utah App.1993) . In this case, the trial court made no factual
findings related to the evidence except that the court overruled
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the objections of the defense to it's introduction (Tr. 10, L. 25
to 11, L. 10; 14, L.24 to 15, L.3; 23, Lines 5 to 8; R. 107-112).
The fact that seven Oriental individuals were in Price, Utah
within forty-eight hours of the burglary does not tend to make more
likely, the assertion that the Defendant who is likewise Oriental,
committed a crime, especially in light of the fact that the clerks
failed to identify the Defendant. Further, none of the coins, tools
or other items found in the car driven by the Defendant related to
the incident in Price.

Accordingly, the evidence is not relevant.

In reviewing the admission of evidence of a prior bad act, the
appellate court must find first, that the prior bad act evidence is
admissible under the provisions of Rule 4 04 (b) , as a matter of law.
Second, the appellate court must determine as a matter of law, that
the trial court acted reasonably in striking the balance between
probative value and prejudice under Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

If either of the tests are not met, the appellate court

must determine if the admission of evidence resulted in prejudicial
error. State v. O'Neil, supra.
Inasmuch as the evidence could not be linked to the Defendant
at all, the evidence was improper under the Rule as a matter of
law.

Further to introduce the evidence because quarters were

involved

and because Oriental males were seen in the area is

tantamount to racism.
fact

Video machines are vandalized on a daily

basis.

That

hardly

justifies

the

introduction

evidence

in a case involving a person charged with a similar

offense when persons of his same race are
14

seen

of

that

in the area.

Obviously, it's introduction was unfairly prejudicial and inasmuch
as there is no relevance, the introduction of the testimony and
evidence was error.
On appeal, this Court must
reasonable

likelihood,

absent

favorable to the Defendant.

determine whether

the

error,

of

an

there

is a

outcome

more

Sate v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 239-40

(Utah 1992); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21

(Utah 1989);

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986).
In

this

case,

it

is

respectfully

submitted

that

the

introduction of evidence of a crime that was not linked to the
Defendant, created a false premise for the trial court's ruling
regarding the propriety of the stop and search of the vehicle the
Defendant was driving' and the finding of the establishment of the
corpus

delicti.

Appellant

respectfully

submits

that

the

introduction was prejudicial and that absent the introduction of
the evidence, a result more favorable to the Defendant would have
occurred.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER.
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman,
739 P.2d 616, 617-18

(Utah 1987) describes the three levels of

encounters between police and citizens as follows:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion"
that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
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temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or
is being committed.
Id. , (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.
1984), cert, denied, Hartsel v. United States. 476 U.S. 1142, 106
S. Ct. 2250 (1986) ) .
There is no question that when a law enforcement official
stops a motor vehicle, a "seizure" occurs, giving the participants
therein the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. State v.
Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989).
As stated by the Court in State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88
(Utah App. 1987), a seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be
based on specific articulable facts, which, together with rational
inferences drawn from them, would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a
crime.
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968) required that an officer be able
to point to "specific and articulable facts which taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.

..."

Utah has codified the requirement of reasonable suspicion in
Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 (1990):
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing or
is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of
his actions.
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See also: State v. Deitman, supra. at 617-18.
In determining the existence of "reasonable suspicion," courts
are to engage

in a totality of the circumstances

analysis

to

determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct.

State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991),

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
The cases in which this Court has addressed the issue that
seem to be most applicable to this case are those involving drug
transactions.

In State v. Sykes, supra., the officer stopping the

defendant motorist was able to articulate the following.

Neighbors

had complained about persons entering and leaving the home the
defendant visited at all hours; the deputy had purchased cocaine in
that

area

himself;

there

was

unspecified

information

from

a

confidential informant; and, the defendant entered the home and
left shortly thereafter. Id. at 37. In considering those elements,
the Court stated:
None of these factors, either singly or in the
aggregate, necessarily indicate wrongdoing as
opposed to innocent action by defendant.
At the time of the arrest, any connection between
defendant and illegal activity was purely speculation. The police did not know the identity of the
owner or occupant of the house, and they did not know the
defendant. At that point, they had no positive
evidence linking the house to illegal activity.
Further, Defendant's mere presence in an area
suspected to harbor drug activity does not give
rise to reasonable suspicion that she engaged in
such activity.
Id. at 37.
In State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), the Court
found that the Defendant's general actions in deplaning from a
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flight arriving from Los Angeles, similar to a drug carrier, the
bulge under the Defendant's clothing at waist level and his failure
to produce identification were inadequate circumstances for the
officers to have formed a reasonable articulable suspicion. Id. at
466-67.
The Court held in State v. Truiillo, supra. at 89-90, that the
observance of the defendant in a high crime area carrying a nylon
bag in a

"suspicious" manner, did not justify the Defendant's

detention, in that the totality of circumstances did not constitute
a reasonable suspicion despite the lateness of the hour, the high
crime factor in the area and the subsequent nervous behavior of the
defendant.

See also. State v. Steward, Supra.; Lemon v. State, 580

So.2d 292 (Fla. App. 1991).
As

applied

to the

facts of

this

case, the only

factors

identified by the testifying officers were that Oriental male
individuals were attempting to sell quarters to various businesses
in Utah County, that the coins were wrapped in legal note paper and
that a burglary of coin operated machines had occurred in Price,
Utah.

Additionally, the officers testified that the Defendant

acted nervously (R. 107-112).

There is nothing illegal or improper

in accumulating quarters from personal savings, gambling or regular
business activities.

Additionally, there is nothing improper in

trying to convert those coins to paper money to accommodate payment
of bills or expenses.
number,

is legal.

The possession of coins, even in great

There are many businesses

that take

coins

(laundry, video games, food concessions and arcades), as the major
18

percentage

of

payment

by

customers. The proprietors

businesses

or family members may be paid

of

those

in quarters or take

quarters to pay expenses.
Regardless of the state's attempt to draw the conclusion of
illegality from it, the accumulation and exchange of quarters is
legal and is consistent with legal activity. Although the state was
able to identify the car in question as the car stopping at the
Skyview Cafe to exchange quarters, there is not a scintilla of
evidence that connected the burglaries from 7-11 stores to the
Defendants at the time the stop was made.

The officers in Utah

County had no idea about the specifics of any burglaries when the
Defendant was stopped other than they had occurred.
The same logic used by police officers in this case could
justify seizures from and detentions of our general citizenry.
Every person taking an item into a pawn shop could be detained,
questioned and searched because somewhere in Utah there is going to
be a reported theft of that item (even though it may have occurred
weeks ago) . Although it's possession may not be illegal, the same
rationale could be used to justify the seizure because it might be
related to the theft. Garage sales, newspaper want-ads could create
the same suspicion as the conduct of the Defendant in this case.
As in the cases previously decided by the Court, there are a
large number of items missing from the officer's testimony in this
case.

First, there is no evidence linking the Defendant by name or

specific description (other than he is Oriental) to any previous
wrongdoing.

Second, there was no evidence that the accumulation of
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quarters by the defendants and his companions was equivalent to
criminal behavior.

The police did not have any knowledge of the

Defendant prior to the stop.

The Court's previous analysis of the

facts of the cases cited herein mandate that the Court conclude
that there was not a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of
the vehicle Defendant was driving.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS BASED UPON THE DEFENDANT'S
UNREASONABLE DETENTION.
It is clear that the Defendant, who had the owner's permission
to drive the vehicle had the required permissive and possessory
control of the car to contest a lengthy detention and warrantless
automobile search. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App.
1991) .
The case law in Utah relating to the scope of detention has
developed over the last few years.

It is clear that an officer may

stop a vehicle incident to a traffic offense. State v. Lopez, 831
P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,
157-58
App.

(Utah App. 1992); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah

1992); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257

(Utah App. 1992).

Further, the length and scope of a police officer's detention must
be "strictly tied to and justified by 'the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P. 2d
761, 763 (Utah 1991); State v. Hansen, 193 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28
(Utah App. 1992).
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The

specific

guidelines

were

established

in

State

v.

Sepulveda, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Utah App. 1992) :
Utah courts have determined "an officer conducting
a routine traffic stop may request a driver's
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation." [Citing cases]
The officer may also check for outstanding warrants
"so long as it does not significantly extend the
period of detention." [Citing cases] However, once
the occupants of the vehicle have satisfied the reasons
for the initial stop, the officer must permit them to
proceed. [Citing case]"Any further temporary detention
for investigative questioning after the fulfillment
of the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining
officer has reasonable suspicion of serious criminal
activity."[Citing case] (Emphasis added).
Id. at 71.
In State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431
officer effected a vehicle stop.

(Utah App. 1990),

the

After receiving the driver's

valid driver's license and registration, learning that the van had
been borrowed

to go fishing, determined

that the van was not

reported stolen, and issuing a citation, the officer detained the
defendant based upon his observation of a homemade bed, two gym
bags, and a fishing pole.
the officer

searched

Based upon the consent of the driver,

the van.

In addressing

the question of

whether the officer's continued detention constituted a seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, stated that the proper inquiry
was,
Whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified it in the
first place.
Id.
The Court determined that the defendant's nervousness, failure
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to make

eye contact,

improper

clothing and

equipment

for the

weather and failure to produce evidence of permission to use the
vehicle were insufficient to justify the roadside detention and
questioning. Id. at 436.

The Court held that the detention and

request to search after the purposes of the initial stop had been
accomplished was a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. at 437.
In State v. Lovegren, 829 P. 2d 155 (Utah App. 1992) , the Court
was faced with a situation where an officer had pulled a motorist
over for a traffic violation.

The defendant was wearing sunglasses

and the vehicle was cluttered.

The officer asked and received

permission to search the vehicle, ultimately producing a controlled
substance.

On appeal the Court held that the cluttered condition

of the car and bloodshot eyes were not indicative of criminal
behavior and the request to search the vehicle was improper. Id. at
158. See also. State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).
In applying the facts of this case to the prior decisions of
the Utah Appellate Courts, it is necessary to determine the reason
for the traffic stop.

Deputy Hill testified that when an Attempt

to Locate is received on a particular vehicle, the procedure is to,
"stop the vehicle and obtain the information from them, contact the
agency that originated the ATL, and find out information that they
would like us to." (Tr. 68, Lines 13 to 18).
The

Defendant

was

pulled

over

by

Patrolman

Shields

immediately, took the keys to the car from the ignition.

who
The

Defendant was asked to exit and vehicle and Patrolmen Shields
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informed the Defendant why he had stopped him and asked him if he
had large amounts of quarters. The Defendant responded that he did
not.

Additionally, the Defendant indicated that he had not been

through

Price.

Aside

from obtaining

the Defendant's

driver's

license, no other efforts were taken by the patrolman to elicit any
further information. (Tr. 59, Line 15 to 61, Line 4 ) .
Deputy Hill testified that it took him fifteen minutes to
arrive at the scene after the Defendant's vehicle was stopped (Tr.
73, Lines 1 to 3) . It is clear that the Defendant was simply being
detained at the scene awaiting the arrival of more officers. Once,
the Defendant was taken away from the car, the officers commenced
a warrantless search of the car without the permission of the
Defendant.
There

is no question that Patrolman Shields obtained

the

information required by the ATL including all relevant data on the
Defendant and where he had been traveling.

The detention of the

vehicle and the Defendant thereafter was unreasonable and outside
the scope of the purpose of the stop.

The law enforcement officers

gathered no evidence of any kind to bolster a claim of illegal
behavior.

There was

nothing

irregular

about

the

Defendant's

license, the car was not reported stolen, and the officers did not
observe anything about the car upon which further detention could
be justified or upon which the search could be based.
Again, all the State produced to justify the stop and the
length of the detention was information that the Defendant or a
person in his vehicle was trying to exchange quarters wrapped in
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notebook paper for currency at various businesses in Utah County.
The

attempt

to

elevate

the

unrelated

burglary

in

Price

that

occurred sixteen days before to some kind of exigent circumstance,
justifying the detention of the Defendant is asinine.

As detailed

in the Statement of Facts, all that was really obtained relating to
Carbon County, before the traffic stop, from the officials in
Price, was

there had been

"thefts and burglaries

and vending

machines [sic] where quarters had been taken" (Tr. 37, Lines 6 to
10) .

The leap to the conclusion that persons in Price wanted to

talk to the Defendant is absolutely unsupported by any testimony in
the Transcript by a person that talked to Carbon County officials.
Specifically, Finding of Fact number 3, to the extent it isolates
the conversation with Carbon County to the burglary at the 7-11 in
Price on October 10 or 11, is completely unsubstantiated by the
testimony (R. Ill)
All

that

was

known

is

set

out

above

and

none

of

that

information linked the defendant to any crime or illegal behavior
and the record is clear that there was nothing about his driving,
registration or the inside of the car that justified the detention.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS BASED UPON THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE,
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah
1978) adopted the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), allowing the warrantless
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search of an automobile where the law enforcement officers possess
probable cause for the search and there are exigent circumstances
justifying the warrantless search.
As detailed in the previous point, there was no probable cause
for the traffic stop or the detention of the Defendant.
that

absent

any

evidence

at

that

juncture,

there

It follows
can

be

no

justification of the warrantless search.
The possession of quarters is legal. The exchange of quarters
for currency is legal. The stop, detention and search of a vehicle
based upon one call by a dispatcher to a Carbon County dispatcher
that a number of thefts and burglaries had occurred

involving

quarters is not reason to stop all persons having quantities of
quarters in their possession.

Again, there was no information

communicated from Carbon County that, at the time of the stop, even
indicated

the

involvement

of

Oriental

males,

let

alone

the

Defendant or the other occupants of the car; or, a citing of the
vehicle he was driving in the area of a burglary; or even a time
reference on when the crimes were supposedly committed.
of

the

trial

court's

Findings

indicates

only

one

A review
paragraph,

relating to the commission of a crime and that is Paragraph 3 which
is totally vague, ambiguous and devoid of any relationship to the
Defendant (R. Ill).
The Defendant submits that any claim to probable cause is
simply not substantiated in the record and the evidence from the
search should be suppressed.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION BASED UPON THE ABSENCE
OF INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE.
The Defendant contends that the trial court allowed evidence
of his confession to be introduced before sufficient independent
evidence of a crime was introduced.

Utah law on the subject is

established by State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah
1957).
In that case the Court noted that the "rule is quite universal
that an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction of a crime, but there must be evidence,
independent of the confession to establish the corpus delicti." Id
at 354.

The rule established in the English common law was to

prevent the conviction of the innocent on the strength of false
confessions. Id. at 354.
In defining a test to describe the quantum of proof necessary
to establish the crime and satisfy the requirement, the Court
stated:
Although they vary, it seem quite generally agreed
that the evidence of the corpus delicti need not
be "beyond reasonable doubt," "conclusive" or
"sufficient to warrant a conviction," independent
of other evidence. From a perusal of such authorities
it seem to us, that the generally accepted view, to
which we give our approval, is that the evidence
independent of the confession need not establish the
corpus delicti by separate, full or positive proof,
and that the whole evidence, including the confession,
may be considered together in determining whether
the corpus delicti has been satisfactorily established
. . . . (Emphasis added)
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Id. at 356. Justice Crockett then stated that the rule to be
employed is that there must "be independent, clear and convincing
evidence of the corpus delicti. . . . "

Id. at 357. See also.

State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954).
The standard set out above raises the inquiry as to whether,
independent of the confession, there was independent, clear and
convincing evidence of the crime.

The fact is that there was no

evidence of a crime to which the Defendant can be linked.

As set

out above, there is not one scintilla of evidence that links the
Defendant to the burglary of the 7-11 Store in Price, other than he
is Oriental.
area.

No one can place the Defendant at the 7-11 or in the

The store clerk could not identify him, the car or the other

occupants.

No one has been able to determine the origin of the

quarters as coming from a particular spot and the tools found in
the car cannot be linked forensically to any crime.

There is

simply no evidence of a crime or that the quarters were stolen.
It is respectfully submitted that there was no independent
evidence of the crime.
CONCLUSION
The testimony in this case establishes that the trial court
allowed evidence of the burglary in Price to inundate every aspect
of

the

Defendant's

trial.

The

evidence

concerning

the

7-11

burglary should never have been introduced because of a total lack
of foundation linking the crime or the individuals spotted
therein to the Defendant or his companions. Yet the burglary that
occurred sometime during a forty-eight hour period, sixteen days
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before the Defendant was stopped was allowed into evidence to
establish a prior bad act of the Defendant and the supposed basis
for a vehicular stop, detention and search.

The evidence should

have been excluded and it's absence leaves a void of any evidence
establishing cause to stop, search and detain the Defendant.
The trial court erred in finding that there was a reasonable
suspicion for the stop, the detention and a search of the vehicle.
The evidence obtained should have been suppressed.
Finally, there was no independent evidence of a crime, apart
from the confession and the conviction on that basis, should be
reversed.
Dated this

3d

day of November, 1993.

^2-,—Z±(^4^f**fr&~

Steven B. Killpc
:torney for Defendant/Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that four (4) copies of the Appellant's Brief were
mailed to Jan Graham, Attorney General, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84114, on this 3d> day of November, 1993.
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COURT OF APPEALS

ADDENDUM

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH/

:
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

:

SON T. NGUYEN#

:

Case No. 921400546 FS

:

Judge Guy R. Burningham

Defendant(s).

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Guy R.
Burningham presiding on the 20th day of January, 1993.

The

Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney Cleve
Hatch.

The Plaintiff was represented by Deputy Utah County

Attorney, James R. Taylor.

The matter was tried to the bench and

the Court considered the Defendant's various Motions in Limine and
to Suppress Evidence.

The Court being fully advised in the

premises does hereby make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On October 27, 1992, Maxine Barker, the owner/manager of

a restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon observed a small car described
as a Datsun or Toyota, cream or tan in color, occupied by five
Asian individuals as it pulled up to her restaurant.

One of the

individuals came in and offered to sell her quarters. He indicated
that he had two to three hundred rolls of quarters-

Mrs. Barker

purchased a couple of rolls which were wrapped in yellow notebook

paper and obtained the license number of the Toyota car as it drove
away.

Shortly after the individuals left Mrs. Barker went to a

telephone and called Utah County Dispatch and provided all of this
information.
2.

Utah County Dispatchers

in cooperation with patrol

officers determined that shortly after the incident with Mrs.
Barker additional attempts to sell quarters were made at two more
businesses west of the first restaurant in Spanish Fork Canyon.
3.

Dispatchers contacted Price and were told that Price

Police were investigating a recent burglary and theft involving
large numbers of quarters from a video arcade machine.
4.

Dispatchers ran a computer check on the license number

provided and determined that the registered owner of the vehicle
had a Vietnamese name and had a suspended driver's license.
5.

Dispatchers broadcast an "ATL" (attempt to locate) to

patrol officers including the Utah County Sheriff and local police
departments and contacted Highway Patrol dispatch.
6. The information was dispatched to Highway Patrol officers
and Department of Transportation vehicles.
7.

Shortly thereafter a small Toyota with the same license

plate number occupied by four Asian individuals was observed
northbound on Interstate 15. Highway Patrol troopers and other law
enforcement agencies responded and the vehicle was stopped just
west of American Fork on Interstate 15.
8. A Utah Highway Patrol trooper approached the car and spoke
with the driver who was the Defendant, Son t. Nguyen.
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The

Defendant denied having any quarters in the car or any knowledge of
any incident in Price or Spanish Fork Canyon.
9.

The Defendant was not the registered owner of the car.

Although he stated that the registered owner was a friend he was
unable to give a full name, address, or phone number.
10.

Officers

opened

the

trunk

of

the automobile

and

discovered a bag containing a large number of quarters, some
wrapped in yellow notebook paper. Officers also found bolt cutters
and tools in a separate bag in the trunk and additional rolls of
quarters in the passenger compartment of the car.
11. The Defendant was advised of his miranda rights, which he
waived,

and

conversed

with

Deputy

Dave

Hill

at

the

scene

demonstrating an ability to speak and understand the English
language.
12. The quarters were taken into evidence and counted when it
was determined that there was a total of $2,096.75 in quarters.
13.

The

Defendant

was

taken

to American

Fork

Police

Department where he was again advised of his miranda rights and
questioned by Detective Scott Carter of the Utah County Sheriff's
Office after indicating that he was willing to waive his rights and
speak without an attorney.
14.

The Defendant admitted to Detective Carter that he had

been in Colorado with his friends and that they had burglarized
several 7-11 stores.

The Defendant stated that the quarters had

been taken from video arcade games in the 7-11 stores.

The

Defendant stated that he thought there were approximately $550.00
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worth of quarters.
15. The Defendant was again interviewed several days later by
Detective Carter.

The Defendant executed a written waiver of his

miranda rights and wrote and signed a confession which was accepted
into evidence.
16.

The written statement of the Defendant was as follows:

They borrow the car let drove it to Co. Spring 2 7eleven
when we frist got in to C.S. then we rent a motel 2
nights and after that we hit 4 more 7eleven then we drove
to denver to eat and then drove home. We took quarters
from the machine. I was with Monk, long, nam, nam.
During the same interview the Defendant described to Detective
Carter in detail how the burglaries would be performed.

He stated

that a group of individuals, all oriental, would go into the stores
which were always 7-11's.

They would play the video machines for

a period of time until the clerk was no longer interested.

They

would then cut off the lock and completely remove the box for
catching coins and simply walk out of the store with the stolen
quarters and equipment.
16. On October 10, 1992, a 7-11 in Price was burglarized. At
approximately 2:00 a.m. seven oriental individuals entered the
store

and

began

playing

approximately forty minutes.

video

games

which

they

did

for

The individuals then left and the

clerk didn't notice anything wrong with the video machine. At the
beginning of the next shift it was noticed that the video machine
was blank and not operating.

The owner checked the machine and

discovered that the lock to the coin box had been cut, the door to
the coin collection box pried opened and the coin box removed. The
4

Price City Police were called to the 7-11 and an official report
was taken and an investigation started.
17. It was stipulated that the bolt cutters seized in the car
the Defendant was driving was excluded as having cut the lock on
the 7-11 in Price.
18.

The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that on or

about October 27, 1992, in Utah County the Defendant retained the
property of another person knowing the property had been stolen or
believing that it probably had been stolen with the purpose to
deprive the owner of the property and the property was cash or
coins with the value of more than $250.00 but less than $1,000.00.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The initial stop of the automobile being driven by the

Defendant was lawful being based upon reasonable suspicion that the
Defendant or the occupants of the car were involved in video
burglaries in the Price area or that the occupants of the car
contained evidence which may have been relevant to the Price
investigation.
2. The detention of the Defendant and the other passengers of
the car did not exceed the scope of the initial stop.
3.

The warrantless search of the automobile was based upon

probable cause and exigent circumstances.

More specifically, a

reasonable person in viewing the evidence available to the officers
could have concluded that it was likely that the automobile
5

contained evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of coins in the
Price area.

Inasmuch as

the potential

evidence was

in an

automobile traveling away from the suspected crime and the best
information available indicated that the occupants were in the
midst of actively disposing of potential evidence, there were
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search.
4.

Although the evidence independent of the Defendant's

confession by itself does not establish the corpus delicti of the
crime charged when considered together with the confession the
Court believes that there is substantial separate evidence of the
corpus delicti such that reasonable minds could believe that the
crime was a real one which was in fact committed and not one which
was fanciful or imaginary.
5. The Defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily made
following an appropriate waiver of his rights to counsel as
required by Miranda.
6. The Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of
Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree felony.
DATED this

day of January, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

GUY R. BURNINGHAM
DISTRICT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

CLEVE HATCH
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH#

:
O R D E R
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

SON T. NGUYEN,
Defendant(s).
This matter

came before

Burningham presiding

:

Case No. 921400546 FS

:

Judge Guy R. Burningham

the Court, the Honorable

on the 20th day

of January,

Guy

1993.

R.
The

Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney Cleve
Hatch.

The

Plaintiff

was

Attorney, James R. Taylor.

represented

by

Deputy

Utah

County

The Court having made and entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence grounded in

the stop of the car and the search is denied.
2.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the confession of the

Defendant based upon a claim that he did not waive his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel is denied.
3.

The

Defendant's

Motion

to

exclude

the

Defendant's

confession pursuant to the corpus delicti rule is denied.
4.

The Defendant's Motion in Limine to exclude evidence on

the grounds of relevance is denied.
5.

The

Court

adjudges

that

the Defendant

is guilty

of

retaining another person's property on or about October 27, 1992,
in Utah County, knowing

that the property had been stolen or

believing that the property probably had been stolen with the
purpose to deprive the owner where the property had a value in
excess of $250.00 but less than $1,000.00 in violation of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 76-6-408, a Third Degree felony.
6.
Probation

The matter
and

investigation.

Parole

is

referred

for

the

to

the

Department

preparation

of

a

of

Adult

presentence

The Defendant is ordered to be present on the 17th

day of February, 1993, at the hour of 8:00 o'clock a.m. for the
purpose of sentencing.
DATED this

Bail shall remain as previously ordered.
day of January, 1993
BY THE COURT:

GUY R. BURNINGHAM
DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

CLEVE HATCH
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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